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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Danielle Schreiner pled guilty in one case to
grand theft by possession of stolen property and was sentenced to ten years, with five
years fixed. Ms. Schreiner, in a separate case, pled guilty to one count possession of
methamphetamine and was sentenced to three years with one year fixed. The district
court initially placed Ms. Schreiner on probation in both cases; however, after she
admitted a second time that she violated her probation in the two cases, the district
court revoked her probation.
On appeal, Ms. Schreiner asserts that the district court deprived her of her
constitutional rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection when it revoked her
probation, telling her it was incarcerating her in order to prevent her from becoming
pregnant.
Additionally, Ms. Schreiner asserts that the district court erred in revoking her
probation as her probation violations did not warrant revocation and further erred in
denying her I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for leniency in light of the new or
additional information she submitted in support of her motions.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket No. 43709 (Twin Falls County district court case number
2012-12126 (hereinafter, the theft case)) and Supreme Court Docket No. 43734 (Twin
Falls County district court case number 2013-1281 (hereinafter, the possession case))
have been consolidated for appellate purposes. (R., pp.296, 298, 598, 600.)
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In Twin Falls case number CR12-12126, Danielle Schreiner found a credit card
belonging to another person in the trash can at her house. (Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)
Albertsons.

(PSI, p.3.)

Ms. Schreiner used the card to purchase a gift card at

Based on these facts, Ms. Schreiner was charged by

Information with grand theft by possession of stolen property. (R., pp.67-69.) Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Ms. Schreiner pled guilty to grand theft by possession of stolen
property. (R., pp.87-97.) The district court sentenced Ms. Schreiner to a unified term of
ten years, with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction, after which the court suspended
the sentence and placed Ms. Schreiner on probation for three years. (R., pp.109-114,
120-141.)
In Twin Falls County case number CR13-1281, law enforcement entered a motel
room to serve a misdemeanor arrest warrant on Ms. Schreiner and saw a piece of tinfoil
containing a white substance.

(R., pp.322-323.)

Ms. Schreiner was charged by

Information with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.362-364.) Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Ms. Schreiner entered an Alford1 plea of guilty to possession of
methamphetamine. (R., p.365.) The district court sentenced Ms. Schreiner to three
years, with one year fixed, to be served consecutively to the sentence in the theft case,
but the court retained jurisdiction.2

(R., pp.390-395.)

After a successful rider, the

district court suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Schreiner on probation for three
years. (R., pp.400-422.)
On March 24, 2014, the State filed a report of probation violation in both cases in
which it asserted that Ms. Schreiner violated her probation by failing to perform her

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2

community service, using methamphetamine twice, moving without her probation
officer’s permission, being discharged from a treatment program, associating with
persons her probation officer had instructed her not to have contact with, and failing to
submit to drug testing. (R., pp.144-156, 426-434.)
Ms. Schreiner admitted to violating some of the conditions of her probation.
(R., pp.176, 448.) The district court continued Ms. Schreiner on probation, but added
additional terms to her probation, including a requirement that she serve two more
months in the county jail as a condition of probation. (R., pp.175-186, 453-458, 491502.)

Ms. Schreiner was accepted into drug court.

(R., pp.205, 490.)

After

participating in the program for 53 weeks, she was terminated in 2015 after a relapse.
(R., pp.224-227, 503-517.)
Thereafter the State filed a report of probation violation in both cases in which it
asserted that Ms. Schreiner violated her probation by being expelled from drug court,
violating her curfew, using methamphetamine and marijuana, failing to submit to drug
tests and/or submitting diluted samples, and associating with persons on felony
probation. (R., pp.245-248, 525-528.)
Ms. Schreiner admitted to violating some of the conditions of her probation.
(R., pp.263, 558.) The district court revoked Ms. Schreiner’s probation in both cases,
telling her, “[a]ny woman who uses methamphetamine while pregnant does not deserve
to live in a free society” (10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.4-5), and revoking her probation as it
was “not going to take a chance for the next six years that you’re going to get pregnant

2

The theft case and the possession case were set together for sentencing. (R., p.377.)
3

again and use meth and potentially destroy another child’s life.” (10/14/15 Tr., p.18,
Ls.11-13; 10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-18; R., pp.262-266, 559-568.)
Ms. Schreiner filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied by
the district court without a hearing.

(R., pp.274-281, 284-287, 576-583, 586-589.)

Ms. Schreiner filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.267-270, 299-306, 569-572, 601604.)

4

ISSUES
1.

In revoking Ms. Schreiner’s probation to prevent her from becoming pregnant, did
the district court violate Ms. Schreiner’s constitutional rights to privacy, due
process, and equal protection?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in revoking Ms. Schreiner’s probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Schreiner’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motions in both cases?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Violated Ms. Schreiner’s Privacy, Equal Protection, And Due Process
Rights Under The Idaho And U.S. Constitutions When It Revoked Her Probation In
Order To Keep Her From Becoming Pregnant
A.

Introduction
Danielle Schreiner suffers from drug addiction. (PSI, p.107.) While pregnant and

on probation in 2015, Ms. Schreiner admitted that she smoked methamphetamine on
two occasions. (10/14/15 Tr., p.5, L.24 – p.6, L.8; R., p.526.) Although her (twin)
babies were born healthy, the district court found her actions egregious and revoked her
probation. (10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-18.) The district court told Ms. Schreiner “[a]ny
woman who uses methamphetamine while pregnant does not deserve to live in a free
society” (10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.4-5) and it revoked her probation as it was “not going to
take a chance for the next six years that you’re going to get pregnant again and use
meth and potentially destroy another child’s life.” (10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-13.) Such
violated Ms. Schreiner’s rights to privacy, equal protection, and due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution
because, had Ms. Schreiner not been a woman capable of bearing children, she would
presumably have been allowed to continue on probation.
B.

The District Court Committed Fundamental Error In Revoking Ms. Schreiner’s
Probation In Order To Keep Ms. Schreiner From Becoming Pregnant
The appellate courts will only review errors that were not objected to below if the

error was fundamental.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). An error is

fundamental if it:

6

(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. If the
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and
remand.
Id.
Preliminarily, the district court’s decision to revoke probation was fundamental
error. First, the district court violated Ms. Schreiner’s unwaived privacy, equal
protection, and due process rights when it revoked her probation, after previously
determining that probation was an appropriate sentence, apparently because it believed
Ms. Schreiner’s ability to potentially become pregnant (and potentially use
methamphetamine), warranted different treatment than a probationer who could not
become pregnant. The district court told Ms. Schreiner “[a]ny woman who uses
methamphetamine while pregnant does not deserve to live in a free society” (10/14/15
Tr., p.18, Ls.4-5) and it revoked her probation as it was “not going to take a chance for
the next six years that you’re going to get pregnant again and use meth and potentially
destroy another child’s life.”

(10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-13.)

Second, that violation

plainly exists on the record. (See 10/14/15 Tr.) Finally, that violation was not harmless
because, absent that violation, Ms. Schreiner would be on probation rather than serving
a prison sentence.
C.

The District Court Denied Ms. Schreiner’s Privacy, Equal Protection, And Due
Process Rights By Incarcerating Her To Prevent Her From Becoming Pregnant
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees “equal protection of the laws,” U.S.

Const., amend. XIV, while Article I, Section 2 provides that the “[g]overnment is
instituted for [the people’s] equal protection and benefit.” The Due Process Clause and

7

Article I, Section 13 prohibit the state from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a privacy right, a line of
United States Supreme Court decisions dating back to the 1800’s has recognized that a
right of personal privacy does exist under the United States Constitution. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The Court has found the roots of that right in the First
Amendment, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,
in the Ninth Amendment, and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942), the Court made clear
that the privacy right extends to procreation, “[w]e are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” Id. at 541 (holding that
state’s sterilization law ran afoul of the equal protection clause).

In Griswold v.

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the United States Supreme Court struck down a
state law which criminalized the use of any drug or instrument to prevent contraception,
holding the right to privacy is constitutionally protected from governmental intrusion. Id.
at 484-485 (holding law forbidding use of contraceptives impermissibly interfered with “a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees”); see Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty guarantees include the right to
marry, establish a home and bring up children); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972) (“[I]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
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married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that procreation is a fundamental right
under the Constitution: “If the classification is suspect because it is based on matters
such as race, national origin or alienage, or the statute infringes upon fundamental
rights such as voting, procreation or rights regarding criminal procedure then strict
judicial scrutiny is applied and the classification scheme will be upheld only if necessary
to further a compelling state interest.” Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 713 (1975);
Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386 (1963).
Courts “generally analyze the fairness of relationships between the criminal
defendant and the State under the Due Process Clause, while [courts] approach the
question whether the State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial
benefit available to another class of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.”
State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 609 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 665 (1983).)
In Beardon v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the United States Supreme Court
was presented with the question of whether a sentencing court could properly revoke
probation based on a defendant’s failure to pay a fine without evidence and findings that
he was somehow responsible for the failure to pay the fine, rather than he simply lacked
the financial resources. Beardon, 461 U.S. at 660-661. The Court held that whether
the case is analyzed under the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, a
court must inquire into such factors as “the nature of the individual interest affected, the
extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means
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and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose . . . ”
Id. at 666-667 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)); State v. Braaten,
144 Idaho 606, 609 (Ct. App. 2007).3
Probationers have a protected liberty interest in continuing probation, and so,
retain some level of right to due process. See e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
480-481 (1972); State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766 (2007).

Probationers have an

obvious interest in retaining their conditional liberty, and the State also has an interest in
assuring that revocation proceedings are based on accurate findings of fact and, where
appropriate, the informed exercise of discretion.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611
(1985).
The district court violated Ms. Schreiner’s privacy, equal protection, and due
process rights by incarcerating her to prevent her from becoming pregnant.

First,

Ms. Schreiner had a constitutionally-protected interest in remaining on probation. “[T]o
obtain a protectable right ‘a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead
have a legitimate claim to entitlement to it.’” State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143
(2001) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmate of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979).

Idaho courts have recognized a due process right in probation revocation

proceedings:
Upon the valid conviction and sentencing of a defendant, due process
having been provided, the state may deprive the defendant of his liberty
for the term of the sentence pronounced by the district judge. If the state
Although Beardon and Braaten dealt with the treatment of indigent defendants, this
Court should use the same methods to analyze the deprivation of Ms. Schreiner’s
constitutional rights and the discrimination against her due to her status as a woman
able to bear children.

3
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chooses to give a prisoner back some of his liberty or a right to his liberty
by granting him parole, probation, good time credits, or an expectation of
parole, the state must once again provide the prisoner with due process
before removing the liberty.
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 143 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Ms. Schreiner had a due process right at her probation violation and
disposition hearing. Ms. Schreiner had been on probation for several years, and, during
her most recent probationary period, she had accomplished 15 months of sobriety prior
to her relapse. (10/14/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.6-17.) Ms. Schreiner had a legitimate claim to
continue on probation, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections
applied to the district court’s decision to revoke probation. See Coassolo, 136 Idaho at
143.
Second, the court’s statements surrounding its decision to revoke probation were
not rationally related to the various legitimate government interests at play in this case.
Idaho’s interests at sentencing are ensuring public safety, followed by rehabilitation,
deterrence, and retribution. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011). Although the
district court initially went through Ms. Schreiner’s probationary history, it drifted into
finding that Ms. Schreiner should not be permitted to reside in a free society because
she had used methamphetamine while pregnant, and ultimately revoked her probation
to prevent her from becoming pregnant for six years. (10/14/15 Tr., p.15, L.3 - p.18,
L18.)

While the State of Idaho undoubtedly has an interest in healthy residents,

incarcerating someone to prevent them from potentially becoming pregnant and
potentially having unhealthy children violates rights to procreative choice, in addition to
equal protection concerns.

The classification drawn here—probationers who could

theoretically become pregnant versus probationers who could not become pregnant—is
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not rationally related to any legitimate state interests. Such a distinction necessarily
requires discrimination between male and female probationers, and an additional
distinction between fertile and non-fertile female probationers.
Finally, the district court had several alternatives to incarceration. The district
court could have, for example, continued Ms. Schreiner on probation but required a
strict inpatient drug treatment program. Further, the district court could have retained
jurisdiction over Ms. Schreiner to allow her to receive intensive treatment with the Idaho
Department of Corrections.

Incarcerating Ms. Schreiner was certainly not the only

option, and multiple alternatives were suggested to the district court at the disposition
hearing. (See 10/14/15 Tr.) Ultimately, Ms. Schreiner’s drug use while pregnant was
not as voluntary of an act as the district court believed.

As noted by the Florida

Supreme Court in Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992):
To punish a person for substance abuse ignores the impaired capacity of
these individuals to make rational decisions concerning their drug use. “In
all but a few cases, taking a harmful substance such as cocaine is not
meant to harm the fetus but to satisfy an acute psychological and physical
need for that particular substance. If a pregnant woman suffers from a
substance dependency, it is the physical impossibility of avoiding an
impact on fetal health that causes severe damage to the fetus, not an
intentional or malicious wish to cause harm.” Punishment is simply not an
effective way of curing a dependency or preventing future substance
abuse. Id. at 2667.
Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296 (internal citations omitted); see also Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 674 n. 2 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The belief that fear
of punishment is a vital factor in deterring an addict from using drugs rests upon a
superficial view of the drug addiction process and the nature of drug addiction.”)
(citation omitted); cf. State v. Cornwall, 95 Idaho 680, 685 (1974) (acknowledging that
“alcoholism is a disease requiring treatment like any other disease”).
12

Disparate treatment of a non-pregnant woman who had in the past used drugs
while pregnant violates a woman’s fundamental right to privacy, liberty, and personal
autonomy, including the privacy of choosing whether to bear children. See People v.
Bedenkop, 625 N.E.2d 123, 129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (reversing sentence premised on
defendant's conduct in giving birth to an addicted baby while on probation and on the
court's desire to insulate defendant from further opportunities for pregnancy); see also
State v. Ikerd, 850 A.2d 516, 521 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (assuming without
deciding that the punishment imposed upon the defendant solely the result of her status
as a pregnant addict violated her constitutional rights).
In Ikerd, the appellate court found that the sentencing judge sent Ikerd to prison
solely to protect the health of her fetus, a consideration wholly unrelated to her
underlying crime of welfare fraud. The appellate court reinstated the defendant on
probation, explaining:

“The purpose of the criminal justice system is to determine

whether a crime has been committed and, if so, to punish the guilty parties-not to
determine the most effective policy to combat a particular social ill.” Ikerd, 850 A.2d at
522-23 (internal citations omitted).
In Bedenkop, the appellate court held that the sentencing court erred where the
defendant’s sentence was not based on the original crime and her rehabilitative
potential but on conduct occurring since the defendant was put on probation, namely
her use of cocaine while pregnant.4 Bedenkop, 625 N.E.2d at 128-129. The district

Illinois law prohibited the sentencing courts from imposing a sentence based on
conduct which constituted the probation violation, but allowed the court to use the
conduct while on probation to assess the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. Id. at
127. In Bedenkop, the defendant was interrogated by the court for her drug use during

4
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court had imposed the maximum possible sentence after questioning the defendant
about her use of cocaine while pregnant, telling her:
You don't want to have any more children. I'm not in a position of turning
you around having you sterilized or order that your tubes be tied. Right
now, you're a time bomb as far as I'm concerned, ma'am. You and many
individuals that are similarly situated as far as I'm concerned. I don't want
to see you become pregnant for fear of the fact that you may endanger the
life or the quality of life of some more children.
As I say, these children of yours are presently-all four of your children are
in private placement. I think that with respect to sentencing, I'm not here to
punish you, ma'am, believe me I have no intention of doing that, but I
certainly am going to preclude you as best I can for as long as I can from
becoming pregnant.
Id. 625 N.E.2d at 128-129.

The appellate court held that the trial court erred in

sentencing the defendant to seven years imprisonment as a means of pregnancy
prevention. Id. at 129. “By considering as a factor in aggravation defendant’s giving
birth to a cocaine addicted baby, the judge subjected her to additional punishment a
male drug user will never face.” Id. at 129. In reversing the decision of the lower court,
the appellate court noted:
We do not diminish the serious problem of women giving birth to drug
addicted babies, but this problem is not solved by depriving a defendant of
her due process rights and then sentencing her to the maximum period of
incarceration permitted for the offense for which she was on probation as
a means of pregnancy prevention.
Bedenkop, 625 N.E.2d at 129.
While the appellate courts’ decisions in Ikerd and Bedenkop are not controlling
authority, this Court should find these opinions persuasive.

Similar to the facts of

Bedenkop, the district court in this case incarcerated Ms. Schreiner to preclude her from
probation and was sentenced was not based on the original crime and her potential for
rehabilitation, but for conduct occurring since she was put on probation. Id.

14

becoming pregnant.

The district court apparently felt there was a risk that

Ms. Schreiner could potentially become pregnant and could potentially use drugs while
pregnant, that is, the district court revoked Ms. Schreiner’s probation in order to protect
Ms. Schreiner’s future fetuses from Ms. Schreiner’s future drug use.
Ultimately, the district court was incensed by Ms. Schreiner’s use of
methamphetamine while pregnant, and violated Ms. Schreiner’s due process and equal
protection rights by incarcerating her simply to prevent her from becoming pregnant and
using drugs. Further, by incarcerating Ms. Schreiner to prevent her from becoming
pregnant, the district court violated her privacy right to procreative choice.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Ms. Schreiner’s Probation As Her
Probation Violations Did Not Warrant Revocation
A.

Introduction
Ms. Schreiner asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked

her probation and executed her original aggregate sentence of thirteen years, with six
years fixed. She asserts that her probation violations did not justify revoking probation,
especially in light of the goals of rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society
could be best served by her continued supervision under the probation department.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Schreiner’s
Probation And Executed Her Sentence
In light of the significant progress Ms. Schreiner made while on probation, her

probation violations did not justify revoking probation.

There are generally two

questions that must be answered by the district court in addressing allegations of
15

probation violations: first, the court must determine whether the defendant actually
violated the terms and conditions of his probation; and second, if a violation of probation
has been found, the trial court must then decide the appropriate remedy for the
violation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). “The determination of whether
a probation violation has been established is separate from the decision of what
consequence, if any, to impose for the violation.” Id. (quoting State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796, 799 (2004)). Once a probation violation has been found, the district court
must determine whether it is of such seriousness as to warrant revoking probation.
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). However, probation may not be
revoked arbitrarily. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The district
court must decide whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether
probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525,
529 (Ct. App. 2001). If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a
district court’s decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
I.C. § 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529.
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state’s legitimate interest in punishment,
deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order. State v.
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994).
Here, Ms. Schreiner admitted to violating her probation by being terminated from
drug court, using methamphetamine on two occasions, and violating her curfew.
(10/14/15 Tr., p.5, L.9 – p.6, L.8; R., pp.245-248, 525-528.) However, Ms. Schreiner did

16

well on probation for well over a year.

She was successful in drug court for a

substantial period of time until she relapsed during a stressful time in her life. (10/14/15
Tr., p.10, L.12 – p.11, L.9.) Ms. Schreiner was extremely ashamed of her relapse, and
asked the district court to place her back on probation so she would be there to be a
mother to her twins.

(10/14/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-23.)

Nonetheless, she did have 15

months of sobriety prior to her relapse. (10/14/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.6-17.) Notwithstanding,
the district court revoked Ms. Schreiner’s probation.

(10/14/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.8-18.)

While Ms. Schreiner relapsed back on methamphetamine while on probation, she was
honest about her use, and she immediately took steps to get herself back on track,
including additional drug treatment classes. (10/14/15 Tr., p.11, L.21 – p.12, L.13,
L.24.) Therefore, Ms. Schreiner could receive the help she needs to avoid relapsing
again while she resides in the community.
Further, substantial information regarding Ms. Schreiner’s drug addiction was
known by the district court at Ms. Schreiner’s review hearing on November 8, 2013 (see
PSI, pp.4-13, 108) and at her first probation violation disposition hearing and, yet,
despite Ms. Schreiner’s relapse, the court still opted to keep Ms. Schreiner on
probation. (R., pp.189-195.) Although Ms. Schreiner relapsed, she had a job waiting
for her upon her release from custody.

(PSI, p.93.) Her employer at Idaho Pizza

Company wrote a letter to the district court to confirm her employment and to let the
court know that Ms. Schreiner was a very dedicated worker and would have a job at
IPC, should she wish. (PSI, p.93.) Further, Ms. Schreiner was doing well in the sober
living house—she kept her room clean and paid her rent on time. (PSI, p.94.) Thus,
there were no changed circumstances which would justify revocation, other than the fact
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that Ms. Schreiner’s most recent relapse on methamphetamine occurred when she was
pregnant.
Ms. Schreiner’s violation did not justify revoking probation in light of the goals of
rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society could be best served by her
continued supervision under the probation department.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Schreiner’ Rule 35 Motions
In Both Cases In Light Of The New Information Offered
Ms. Schreiner contends that her sentences should have been reduced in light of
the new information submitted in conjunction with her Rule 35 motions. Ms. Schreiner
asserts that the district court’s denial of her motions for sentence modifications in both
her cases represents an abuse of discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Ms. Schreiner asserts that her sentences should have been reduced in light of
the new information submitted in conjunction with her Rule 35 motions. Ms. Schreiner
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asserts the district court’s denial of her motions for modification of her sentences
represents an abuse of discretion.
In support of her motions for sentence reductions, Ms. Schreiner submitted a
memorandum with several attached letters from members of the community which
detailed Ms. Schreiner’s dedication to her recovery. (R., pp.275-281, 577-583.) The
letters contained new information regarding Ms. Schreiner’s mothering skills, her
dedication to her sobriety as well as the conditions surrounding her relapse, and the
need for inpatient treatment.

(R., pp.274-281, 576-583.)

Ms. Schreiner sought a

sentence modification to allow the sentences in her two cases to be served
concurrently, instead of consecutively.5

(R., pp.274-275, 576.)

This would allow

Ms. Schreiner to immediately begin programming and treatment while in IDOC custody.
(R., pp.275, 576-577.) However, the district court denied the motions without a hearing.
(R., pp.284-287, 586-589.)
In light of the new and additional information submitted by Ms. Schreiner in
support of her Rule 35 motions, the district court abused its discretion by not placing her
back on probation or reducing both of her sentences pursuant to her Rule 35 motions.

In discussing Ms. Schreiner’s underlying sentences, the district court noted at the
disposition hearing that, when it initially sentenced Ms. Schreiner on the theft charge,
the sentence was “an extremely heavy sentence even for a grand theft offense.”
(10/14/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.10-13.)

5
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Schreiner respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an
order that she be placed back on probation or, alternatively, that it remand her case with
an order that a new probation violation disposition hearing be held in front of a different
district court judge.
DATED this 30th day of June, 2016.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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